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Dreaming the Whole Cat: Generative Models, Predictive 
Processing, and the Enactivist Conception of Perceptual 
Experience. 
 
ANDY CLARK 
University of Edinburgh 
andy.clark@ed.ac.uk 
 
Abstract  
 
 
Does the material basis of conscious experience extend beyond 
the boundaries of the brain and central nervous system? In 
Clark 2009 I reviewed a number of ‘enactivist’ arguments for 
such a view and found none of them compelling. Ward (2012) 
rejects my analysis on the grounds that the enactivist deploys  
an essentially world-involving concept of experience that 
transforms the argumentative landscape in a way that makes the 
enactivist conclusion inescapable. I present an alternative 
(prediction-and-generative–model based) account that neatly 
accommodates all the positive evidence that Ward cites on 
behalf of this enactivist conception, and that (I argue) makes 
richer and more satisfying contact with the full sweep of human 
experience. 
 
 
 
1. Dialogues Concerning Experience and Action 
 
In Clark 2009 I explore and reject a number of arguments meant - or 
so it seemed - to favour a ‘hypothesis of the extended conscious 
mind’ (ECM). ECM, as I characterized it, was the claim that ‘the local 
[material] vehicles of some of our conscious experiences might 
include more than the whirrings and grindings of the brain/CNS’ 
(Clark 2009 p.967). Despite strongly believing (see Clark 1997) that 
the best way to understand mind and cognition is by attending to 
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complex webs of structure spanning brain, body, and world, and 
despite arguing (Clark and Chalmers 1998, Clark 2008, and 
elsewhere) that certain non-conscious cognitive states might be 
realized by material circuits that loop through brain, body, and 
aspects of surrounding ‘designer environments’, I thus rejected – on 
empirical grounds - the suggestion that the material vehicles of 
conscious experience loop actually do outside the brain and central 
nervous system of the experiencing animal. 
 
In an important and illuminating recent treatment, Ward (2012) 
claims that my negative assessment of enactivist arguments for ECM 
is fundamentally misguided, as it fails to recognize the true shape of 
the enactivist’s project. That project, Ward suggests, is not (or not 
directly) to secure a wider material base for conscious experience so 
much as to urge upon us an alternative conception of the nature of 
conscious experience itself: one from which the apparently radical 
conclusions of ECM flow naturally, perhaps even inexorably. In this 
way ‘once we understand the enactivists as urging a specific personal-
level conception of experience we can see why ECM follows from 
their views’ (Ward 2012, p. ??).  
 
Thus restructured (and here compressing much of Ward 2012 section 
1) the key moves in the enactivist argument look like this: 
 
1. There is no a priori reason to restrict the scope of the 
material (or, as Ward prefers, the sub-personal) basis of 
conscious experience to the realm of the neural, as realized by 
the brain/central nervous system. 
 
2. Knowledge concerning the correct personal-level conception 
of experience is relevant to a characterization of its sub-
personal basis. 
 
3. The correct personal-level conception of experience depicts 
experiences as ‘essentially interactions between a subject and 
parts of the world’ (Ward 2012, p. ??) 
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I happily embrace the first two moves in this argument. Supposing 
that the third was granted then, Ward argues, ECM is as good as 
established. For the internalist alternative to ECM (l call my favoured 
alternative ‘internalist’ largely for want of a better term: but see 
sections 5 and 6 following) offers a picture of the sub-personal basis 
of experience that appears to comport badly with the personal-level 
conception enshrined in (3) above. As Ward puts it: 
 
“If we can give an exhaustive subpersonal characterization of 
my experiential state solely in terms of how things are with me 
internally then how can that state, when viewed at the personal 
level, be essentially a dynamic relationship between me and my 
environment?” (Ward 2012, p. ??) 
 
The upshot, Ward rightly notes, is that ‘enactivists think that ECM 
follows fairly trivially from their position’ (Ward 2012, p. ??). 
 
Much turns, then, on that third move: the move to an essentially 
interactive and world-involving conception of personal-level 
experience itself. I do think that there is something right about that 
conception. What is right is the idea that experience, as it unfolds in 
most normal daily (awake) circumstances, is directly world-revealing, 
and involves a crucial and complex dance between sensory 
transduction and real-world action. It is this dance (sometimes 
referred to as ‘animate’ or ‘active’ perception – see e.g. Ballard 1991, 
Churchland, P.S. et al 1994) that, in such cases, determines the 
contents of the unfolding experience. But it does not follow that the 
material (sub-personal processing) basis of that experience must then 
expand to encompass its own objects. Instead, the material apparatus 
can still quite reasonably be thought to be wholly internal, consisting 
in the way neural systems both elicit and respond to signature 
peturbations from the environment.  
 
I do not (at this point) claim to offer an argument for such a 
conception. I turn to that matter in sections 3 and 4 below. The 
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immediate point is just that, prima facie, a personal-level conception 
of experience as genuinely world-revealing and as typically involving a 
variety of crucial interactions with the environment does not demand 
the rejection of more internalist sub-personal accounts in anything 
like the immediate way that Ward suggests1. I think Ward is right, 
however, to suggest that we try considering the enactivist arguments 
as first and foremost arguments for an alternative conception of 
experience itself, with the conclusions concerning ECM flowing (or 
at any rate, being supposed to flow) fairly directly from that 
conception. What, then, are the arguments meant to suggest this 
crucial conception? 
 
2. The Missing Arguments: Presence, Plasticity, and Fit 
 
As far as I can see, there are two arguments or bodies of evidence 
whose role (according to Ward) is best understood as an attempt 
directly to establish the enactivist conception of experience. These 
are accompanied by a further consideration concerning the proper fit 
between the correct personal-level conception and the sub-personal 
facts. Taken together, these arguments and evidence, accompanied by 
the notion of proper fit, are to deliver the enactivist conception of 
experience itself, from which a version of ECM is meant trivially to 
follow. Although I considered aspects of these arguments in Clark 
2009, I did not consider them, as Ward rightly notes, as first and 
foremost arguments for the enactivist conception of experience itself. 
Let’s see how things look once we make this perspectival shift.                                                         
1 In the end, I think that the only reading of the third move that will serve Ward’s 
argumentative purpose will turn out to be one in which that step is read as involving a quite 
independently motivated claim of metaphysical necessity. Such a reading may be suggested 
by Ward’s apparent endorsement of arguments found in Putnam 1999 and McDowell 1986. 
I do not believe, however, that the enactivists’ argument for ECM was meant simply as a 
rehearsal of these more familiar philosophical worries thought to afflict an internalist 
metaphysic. Nor do I believe (see section 5 following) that the particular forms of 
experiential internalism I defend actually fall foul of such worries. My concern, in any case, 
was with a suite of apparently quite different arguments and considerations: ones that 
attempt to provide additional, more empirically-based, reasons for embracing ECM. 
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The first argument/body-of-evidence involves a complex of claims 
and ideas concerning ‘virtual representation’, ‘virtual presence’, and 
what Noë sometimes refers to (see e.g. the discussion in Noë 2006 
pp. 413-428) as ‘presence-in-absence’. The key observation here is 
that experience presents a world of objects, rather than (merely) a 
world of (what might be called) ‘perspectival takes’ on objects. Thus: 
 
The visual experience of the tomato, when one takes it at face 
value, presents itself to one precisely as a visual experience as of a 
whole tomato. (Noë 2006, p. 413) 
 
This is not to deny that we also see (for example) one side of the 
tomato rather than the other. Instead, both kinds of information are 
somehow present in the visual experience. But this can seem 
puzzling: 
 
How can it be true, as I think it is, that we are perceptually 
aware, when we look at a tomato, of parts of the tomato which, 
strictly speaking, we do not perceive. This is the puzzle of 
perceptual presence. (Noë 2006, p. 414) 
 
 
This is a puzzle about experience. How can experience encompass 
that which is not, in some sense, immediately transduced? The 
answer, according to Noë (and endorsed by Ward) is that 
“Phenomenologically, the world is given in perception as available” 
(Noë 2006, p.422). We have a sense of the visual presence of the 
whole tomato because we know how to move our eyes and heads to 
retrieve more information as required, and we know that if we do so, 
the ‘absent’ side of the tomato will become viewable, and so on. The 
same story accounts, Noë claims, for our experience of the full 
current visual scene as detailed, despite the well-known limits of 
acuity that characterize peripheral vision. Presence in absence is thus 
to be explained by presence as access: 
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The detail is present now, though absent (unseen, out of view, 
partially occluded etc) because we now possess the skills needed 
to bring the relevant features into view. (Noë 2006, p.422) 
 
This delivers, Ward wants to suggest, the enactivist conception of 
experience itself. Once we take the story about access as the correct 
account of the feeling of presence in absence, experience is revealed 
as a way of (or a potentiality of) acting in the world: 
 
Qualities are available in experience as possibilities, as 
potentialities, but not as complete givens. Experience is a 
dynamic process of navigating the pathways of these 
possibilities. (Noë 2006 p. 428) 
 
Ward is right to point to these kinds of observation as shedding light 
on the notion of virtual presence (virtual representation) that I found 
especially puzzling in Clark 2009. Such observations are indeed meant 
to convince us that “experience is a mode of temporally extended 
skilful interaction with the world” (Ward 2012 p. ??). But this is 
convincing only to the extent that the best explanation of these 
various facts (concerning presence-in-absence) is indeed the one that 
conceives of experience itself in this way. In section 3 I shall cast 
substantial doubt on this implicit suggestion. 
 
The second argument/body-of-evidence meant to speak in favour of 
the enactivist conception of experience concerns neural plasticity and 
the so-called ‘variable neural correlates argument’. Here too, Ward 
worries that my previous engagement with the argument (Clark 2009 
pp. 969-972) mistakenly treats it as a failed attempt at a direct 
argument for ECM, rather than a (potentially more successful) 
argument meant to support the enactivist conception of experience. 
The key move here consisted in displaying a variety of cases in which 
the inner story varies greatly, but the agent’s experience is plausibly 
said to remain to some appreciable extent the same. Cases include the 
successful re-wiring of visual input to auditory cortex in young ferrets 
(Sur et al 1999, discussed in Noë 2004 p.227) and the (at least partial) 
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successes of sensory substitution technologies. These allow tactile or 
auditory channels to code inputs tranduced from head-mounted 
cameras in ways that come, with training and practice, to support 
visuomotor engagements with the world and can even result in 
reports of quasi-visual experience (for a fairly recent review, see Bach 
y Rita and Kercel 2003).   
 
In each case (there are other cases too, but these are representative) 
the empirical considerations, or so Ward argues, are not meant as 
direct arguments for ECM. Instead they are best seen, together, as 
building a case for the enactivist conception of experience itself. Thus 
if we ask why it is that different transduction modes (the use of tactile 
or auditory channels to route visual information to the brain) or 
different neural areas (the use of ‘auditory’ cortex for vision) can 
support the same kinds of experience, the answer might be: because 
the various configurations all come to support the same patterns of 
interaction with the world, and it is these patterns (not any resultant 
neural goings-on) that actually constitute the visualness of the 
experience. As Ward puts it: 
 
Such cases are intended to provide evidence that sameness of 
interactive relationship with the world goes hand in hand with 
sameness of experience. This is supposed to support a 
conclusion not about the sub-personal but about what 
experience, for the enactivist, essentially is – a skill-mediated 
relation to the world. (Ward, 2012, p. ??) 
 
If we follow2 Ward and the enactivist this far, the considerations of 
appropriate ‘fit’ between the personal and the sub-personal 
adumbrated in section 1 above bite. The sub-personal machinery of 
experience, if experience really is skill-mediated interactive 
engagement with the actual world, cannot be located in the 
brain/CNS any more than (to follow Ward’s examples from section 4 
of his treatment) the machinery of automotion, if automotion really is                                                         2 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the fluid engagement of car and actual road, could be located in the 
engine. 
 
However, just as in the previous case (of presence-in-absence) all this 
is convincing only to the extent that the best explanation of these 
various facts (in this case, the ones concerning variable neural 
correlates) is indeed the one that conceives of experience itself in this 
way. Time, then, to consider an alternative.  
 
3. Generative Models in Perception, Prediction, and Action. 
 
The last decade of research in machine learning and in computational 
cognitive neuroscience displays a pleasing convergence on an 
explanatory theme. That theme is the use of generative models, 
trained and deployed within a broad framework of prediction-driven 
learning and response, as a general model of cortical sensory 
processing. There are many important variants, nuances, and outright 
differences marking the various approaches that share this broadly 
convergent framework.3 But for present purposes I shall simply 
present the barest possible sketch of some of the main common 
features, before exploring their implications for the enactivist’s 
‘inference to the best explanation’ concerning presence-in-absence 
and variable neural correlates. The key idea is that the brain uses 
prediction-driven processing routines to acquire and deploy 
hierarchical generative models of the hidden causes (sometimes called 
latent variables) that best explain the changing patterns of sensory 
input that impinge upon the agent. It is worth briefly unpacking each 
of these notions in turn.                                                         
3 Some key contributions (but note that these cover a range of approaches) include Rao and 
Ballard 1999; Hinton et al 2006; Hinton 2007a; Friston 2005; Friston et al 2011. For some 
useful reviews of different aspects of this admittedly complex landscape see Hinton 2007b; 
Bubic et al 2010; Huang and Rao 2011. Important precursors include Dayan et al 1995; 
Hinton et al 1994; Hinton and Zemel 1994; Neisser 1967; Gregory 1980.  For some more 
philosophical engagements with aspects of this emerging story, see Grush 1997, 1999, 2004; 
Clark and Grush 1999; Clark 2006, forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b  Eliassmith  2007;  Hohwy 
2007. 
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Prediction-driven processing is processing that is driven by an 
imperative to reduce error in the brain’s own (sub-personal) 
predictions concerning its current and future states. Importantly, it is 
the brain’s attempt to predict its own current states that does much of 
the heavy lifting here. To see why this is crucial, it helps to think of 
the brain as a kind of black box that needs to learn about the world 
while having direct access (in the processing sense of direct access: I’ll 
briefly return to more metaphysical notions of directness and access 
in sections 4 and 5) only to the states and changes of its own internal 
registers4. This image reminds us that the world, to put it bluntly, 
does not get to be inside the brain. Under such conditions, one good 
strategy is to deploy a learning routine that seeks to predict, on the 
basis of the current state of some higher neural population, the 
current state of a lower population. Each layer of neural processing is 
thus trying to predict the current response at the layer below (except 
for the bottom layer, such as the retina, which transduces some 
energetic signal). Under these conditions the brain can self-supervise 
its own learning, as the lower levels do indeed come to occupy 
sequences of states that the higher levels can (in the processing sense) 
access. That means that familiar forms of gradient descent learning 
can be applied so as gradually to move each higher level population 
closer and closer to settings (such as the values of synaptic weights) 
that actually enable successful prediction of the evolving states of the 
population below. By applying this kind of routine within a stacked 
hierarchy of neural populations, the brain comes to learn an inter-
animated set of models (technically, it is then a single generative 
model5) that best capture the regularities that determine the shape of 
those evolving sensory signals. In the case of exteroception, these 
regularities involve the changing states of the external world. (For a 
simple early example of the successful use of such a routine, see Rao 
and Ballard 1999. For a more recent example, see Hohwy et al 2008).                                                         
4 For a wonderful neuroscientific  exploration of this issue, see Rieke at al 1999. 
 
5 Thanks to Karl Friston for pointing this out. 
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Embodiment and action fit very naturally within such a framework. 
Embodiment matters because embodied agents are active agents, and 
active agents can systematically alter their own sensory input streams  
in ways that can drive faster and more successful prediction-based 
learning. In particular, embodied agents can engage in what Pfeifer et 
al (2007) nicely dub the ‘self-structuring of information flows’ – for 
extensive discussion see Clark 2008. An additional reason that such 
active ‘information self-structuring’ may be computationally useful is 
because  self-produced action applies a known (where that really just 
means repeatable-on-demand) transform to the incoming sensory 
data. Thus I can look at several scenes and in each case turn my head 
in just such and such a way. The fact that I am then applying the 
same kind of ‘known transform’ turns out to greatly facilitate the 
extraction of object-specifying information from the time-varying 
stream of sensory data (see Hinton et al 2011).  
 
In addition, embodied agents have two deeply computationally 
related ways to reduce the errors in their own neural predictions. One 
way (perception) is to find and apply the right hypothesis to explain 
the current sensory signal. But the other way (action) is to issue a 
motor command that alters the sensory input bringing it in line with 
the prediction so as to reduce the error (see Friston 2009, 2010; 
Friston et al 2011). Both methods work together seamlessly in the 
embodied agent’s constant quest to reduce prediction error within a 
hierarchy of sensorimotor processing regions. Perception and action 
thus emerge as two sides of a single computational coin. 
 
Prediction-driven processing schemes, operating within hierarchical 
regimes of the kind just described, learn probabilistic generative 
models (within each higher neural population) of the activity patterns 
likely to be displayed in the neural population below. What is crucial 
here – what makes such models generative – is that once learnt they 
must be capable of predicting the patterns characteristic of (the 
responses to sensory input at) the level below. This means being able 
to generate, from the top-down (via a kind of step-wise downwards 
  11 
cascade) the activity patterns characteristic of each lower layer. The 
upshot is that such systems simply as part and parcel of their ability to 
perceive must develop an ability to self-generate perception-like states. 
In learning, such systems typically use perception (attempts at 
bottom-up detection) and generation (attempts at top-down 
prediction) in mutually bootstrapping ways. The upshot is that 
problems that at first sight look like problems of passive perception 
(recognizing and categorizing shapes, to take an example treated in 
Hinton 2007a) thus turn out to require developing something 
potentially much more active (an ability to generate ‘images’ of 
shapes). This deep mutuality between perception and (a kind of) 
imagination is striking, and I shall return to it shortly6. 
 
To sum up, converging paradigms7 in neuroscience and machine 
learning suggest that perception is inextricably tied up not just with 
action but also with something functionally akin to imagination. They 
suggest, moreover, that prediction-driven processing, operating in a 
rich hierarchical setting within the brain, plays a major role in the 
development and deployment of perceptual understanding, and that 
self-generated action enables and enhances such learning in a variety 
of important ways.  
 
4. The Dialogue, Revisited. 
 
I claim that the picture just sketched accounts for everything that the 
enactivist points to as positive evidence for their more ‘interactive’ 
conception of experience itself, that it does so in a way that captures 
some key enactivist insights (concerning the important roles of 
prediction and self-generated action), and (further) that it fluently 
accommodates a number of personal-level phenomena that the pure                                                         
6 I pursue this matter in more depth in Clark forthcoming-a. 
 
7 It is worth stressing that important differences separate many of the treatments reviewed 
above. What unites them is the use of prediction-based learning to acquire generative models 
within hierarchical processing regimes.  
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enactivist struggles valiantly to accommodate. I’ll try to make good 
on each of these claims in turn, before ending with a few words 
about some remaining issues: ones that might reasonably be classed 
as more properly metaphysical in nature. 
 
Let’s start with the alternative account of the positive evidence for 
the enactivist conception of experience itself. That evidence, as we 
saw, comprised two main elements: some considerations concerning 
‘presence-in-absence’, and various experimental results revealing 
variable neural correlates for similar experiences.  
 
The alternative account of the first of these, presence-in-absence, is 
mostly straightforward. To perceive the world, according to the kinds 
of approach sketched in section 3 above, is (as the system relaxes into 
a stable state) to meet incoming driving sensory signals with matching 
top-down expectations generated using a hierarchy of increasingly 
abstract generative models. Basically, these will be models capturing 
regularities across larger and larger temporal and spatial scales. 
Inevitably, the higher levels here will come to encode information 
concerning the kinds of properties and feature that Noë highlights. 
Just as the higher levels in a shape recognition network respond 
preferentially to invariant shape properties (such as squareness or 
circularity) so we should expect to find higher level networks that 
model driving sensory inputs (as filtered via all the intervening levels 
of prediction) in terms of tomatoes, cats, and so forth. The overall 
processing hierarchy, confronted with a scene involving cat or 
tomato, will relax into a stable state in which these higher-level 
patterns are recognized to be present. The fact that only one side of 
the tomato is currently facing us, or that the cat (to use a recurring 
example – see e.g. Noë 2004) is partially occluded behind a picket 
fence, are precisely the kinds of additional detail that the higher level 
models must learn to ignore.  
 
Noë writes that: 
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The challenge of the theory of perception is to appreciate how 
perception can be, in this way, an encounter with how things 
are, when the nature of things necessarily exceeds what can be 
taken in at a glance” (Noë 2008 p. 691, and quoted in Ward 
2012 p.??) 
 
But this poses no problem whatsoever for accounts that must meet 
incoming sensory signals by relaxing into a cascade of top-down 
predictions involving, at the higher levels, models of distal causes 
such as chairs, tables, tomatoes, and cats. On the contrary, insofar as 
there is any kind of puzzle here for the alternative (prediction-and-
generative-model based) account it concerns not ‘presence-in-
absence’ but (paradoxically) ‘absence-in-presence’! The puzzle, that is, 
is why we do not then only experience the cat/tomato as whole. This 
matters since, as Noë rightly insists, such perspectival information is 
important for many purposes, is fully consistent with (indeed, is 
handily diagnostic of) the correct higher-level story, and is clearly 
preserved (as experience attests) even once it has been ‘used’ to select 
the right higher-level hypothesis. Fortunately, there are various ways 
in which this may be achieved8, perhaps the simplest of which is to 
assume that experience is conditioned upon the best linked set of 
hypotheses spanning multiple spatial and temporal scales (given 
current context and accommodating the driving sensory signal).  
 
The situation with regard to variable neural correlates is, if anything, 
even more clear-cut. Given that the alternative (prediction-and-
generative-model based) account posits a kind of canonical cortical 
microcircuit involved in all forms of sensorimotor learning, the 
potential recruitment of ‘auditory’ areas for visual processing (in the 
re-wired ferrets) and the potential for tactile visual sensory                                                         
8 One recently suggested option involves the use of a more complicated architecture in 
which small processing ensembles encode “both the probability that the entity is 
present…and a set of “instantiation parameters” that may include the precise pose, lighting, 
and deformation of the visual entity relative to an implicitly defined canonical version of that 
entity” (Hinton et al 2011 p.2)  
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substitution emerge as natural consequences. The fact that such re-
purposing occurs consequent upon some period of interactive 
engagement reflects only the mundane fact that prediction-driven 
learning requires the use of gradient-descent methods. Using such 
methods, predictions made at all levels of a processing hierarchy are 
gradually altered so as better and better to account for (to predict) the 
evolving sensory input stream across multiple spatial and temporal 
scales. Action, as we saw, plays a very special role in this, since self-
generated actions provide a neat way of regularly manipulating the 
data stream so as to resolve ambiguities, speed up learning, and 
acquire the kinds of knowledge most needed for our species-typical 
practical engagements with the world. Many of the key enactivist 
insights concerning the role of action in perception are thus 
preserved within the alternative account. 
 
The alternative account on offer does not, however, simply 
accommodate the same range of data and intuitions as the enactivist 
account. I think it does appreciably better. Thus recall that a major 
part of the argumentative apparatus that Ward brings to bear on the 
exchange with the enactivist concerns the need to achieve some form 
of ‘fit’ between personal-level experience and the suite of enabling 
sub-personal facts and mechanisms. The enactivist, as presented by 
Ward, uses the positive considerations just rehearsed to motivate a 
conception of experience as “essentially episodes of interaction 
between a subject and parts of the world’ (Ward 2012 p. ??). But this 
conception has a well-known cost. It forces the theorist to take 
complex steps (this can be something of an understatement) to 
accommodate familiar and apparently highly relevant experiential 
phenomena, such as dreams and mental imagery. Time precludes a 
proper examination of the many ingenious ways that Noë and others 
hope to accommodate such phenomena while yet insisting that what 
experience  actually is is ongoing dynamic interaction with the world 
(see eg Noë 2006 p 430-431, and discussion in Block 2005). I note 
only that a common move is to concede that dream experiences, 
unlike normal daily percepts, do indeed “depend on neural states 
alone” (Noë 2006 p. 431) but then to insist that they are quite unlike 
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normal perceptual experiences that are instead “anchored by our 
dynamic coupling to the world” (Noë, op cit). Here, I think our 
alternative account can do significantly better, clarifying both the 
commonalities and the differences, in a way that makes more 
satisfying contact with ordinary experience. 
 
Let’s take the commonalities first. It is suggestive that early 
explorations of the use of generative models for perception deployed 
learning algorithms with names such as the ‘wake-sleep algorithm’ 
(Hinton et al 1995) and spoke easily and repeatedly of neural 
networks generating patterns for themselves ‘in fantasy’. As we saw, 
where there is a generative model, at level N, of some pattern of 
response as it might occur at level N minus 1, there is the capability 
to actively promote (from the top down) that very pattern of activity 
at the lower level. Systems that know how to perceive an object as a 
cat are thus systems that, ipso facto, are able to use a top-down 
cascade to bring about the kinds of activity pattern that would be 
characteristic of the presence of a cat. Such systems thus display what 
(Clark (forthcoming-a)) I call a ‘duality of perception and 
imagination’9. 
 
This seems to me to be of profound interest. Perceivers like us, if this 
is correct, are inevitably potential dreamers and imaginers too. 
Moreover, they are beings who, in dreaming and imagining, are 
deploying many of the very same strategies and resources used in 
ordinary perception. I think this (partial) mimesis between 
perception, dreaming, and imagining actually sits much better with 
our daily personal-level experience than do alternative accounts that 
treat them as radically divergent states.  
 
                                                        
9 Note that this does not imply that subjects can bring this about at will, nor that their 
dreamings and imaginings will, in the typical case, reproduce ordinary perceptual states in all 
their detail and stability. For the former caveat, see Clark (forthcoming-a). For the latter, see 
the comments in section 4 following. 
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It is important, however, to do justice not just to the (at least 
apparently10) experienced commonalities but to the experienced 
differences too. Noë’s response to the dreaming example, as 
mentioned above, is to suggest that dreams constitute a radically 
altered form of experience. This seems to me already to represent a 
major concession, since it allows that at least some genuine 
experiences are not well-characterized using the enactivist 
conception11. But it is, in any case, a move that the kind of 
prediction-and-generative-model-based internalism sketched earlier 
need not (and ought not) to reject. For nothing in that view requires 
that the system, when simply cycling, in the sleep or imagining state, 
in the absence of ongoing driving external inputs, will typically 
support the very same kinds of stability and richness of experienced 
detail that daily sensory engagements offer. Indeed, there are several 
reasons to doubt this.  
 
In the absence of the driving sensory signal, no stable ongoing 
information about low-level perceptual details is there to constrain 
the system. As a result, there is no obvious pressure to maintain a 
stable hypothesis at the lower levels of processing: there is simply 
whatever relatively amorphous pressure the current higher-level story 
exerts. In waking life, we (or rather, our brains) can indeed expect - 
just as the enactivist stresses - the persisting external scene to provide 
vital stabilizing pressure.  Moreover, altered chemical states of the 
brain accompany sleeping and there exists a surprising amount of 
overlap between the electrophysiological and neurochemical changes 
characteristic of the sleep-state and changes characteristic of 
schizophrenia and drug-induced hallucinations. Explanations of these 
                                                        
10 The caveat recognized the logical space for a variety of disjunctivist proposals hereabouts, 
a consideration of which is well beyond the scope of the present treatment. For an excellent 
introduction, see the essays in Haddock and Macpherson 2008. 
 
11 An alternative would have been to insist that dream content inherits some kind of 
constitutive world-involvingness from ordinary perceptual content. For some useful 
discussion of the range of possibilities hereabouts, see Block 2005. 
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latter conditions12 using the apparatus of generative models and 
hierarchical predictive processing (see e.g. Fletcher and Frith 2009 
and Corlett et al 2009) are thus suggestive with regard to the 
peculiarities of sleep and dreaming. Thus Fletcher and Frith speculate 
that: 
 
“Perhaps the dream state arises from disruptions in 
hierarchical…processing such that sensory firing is not 
constrained  by top-down prior information and inferences are 
accepted without question owing to an attenuation of the 
prediction-error signal from lower to higher levels” (Fletcher 
and Frith 2009 p. 52) 
 
Much more work needs to be done to make this kind of suggestion 
precise. The point for current purposes is simply that the kinds of 
internalist model highlighted above13 have the pleasing property of 
presenting perception, dreaming, and imagination within a single 
unifying framework while leaving plenty room for the kinds of typical 
difference (with respect to detail, richness, stability, and overall 
coherence) highlighted by Noë and the enactivists. 
 
                                                         
12 Under conditions where perceptual detail matters, and where (the brain’s) confidence in 
the driving sensory signal is high, the weighting on the prediction error units closer to the 
sensory peripheries is increased so as to ensure those error signals get to play a larger role in 
determining the current set of linked (multi-scale) hypotheses (see the discussion of 
‘precision’ in Friston 2009 and in Feldman and Friston 2010). The flexible weighting of 
prediction error is a major feature of these models, and plays a central role in recent 
accounts, using this framework, of delusions and hallucinations in schizophrenia. The central 
hypothesis (Fletcher and Frith 2009) is that in such cases prediction error signals are falsely 
generated, wrongly weighted, and (thus) accorded undue salience (perhaps due to abnormal 
dopaminergic functioning).  
 
13 In Clark 2009 I also presented some important empirical considerations concerning the 
possible role of very fast temporal synchronies in the construction of coherent percepts. 
Such synchronies, it has recently been suggested, may play a crucial role in the flexible 
control of the influence (weighting) of prediction error. For discussion, see Feldman and 
Friston 2010. 
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5. The Porous Perceiver 
 
Ward’s treatment is sprinkled, as mentioned earlier, with another kind 
of consideration. Here, the enactivist is paired with philosophers such 
as McDowell (1986) and Putnam (1999) who are said to be opposing 
“the Cartesian conception of our minds as seats of pure subjectivity, 
blocked off from the environment by our sensory transducers” 
(Ward, 2012, p ??). The enactivist’s conception, by depicting 
experience as essentially interactive and world-involving, is said to 
avoid this threat. It does so by building the experienced world right 
into the account of experience itself: an account that is now first and 
foremost an account of inescapably world-involving relations and 
interactions.  
 
To adopt such a story, on the grounds that it is simply required if we 
are to ensure proper contact with the world (to ensure that 
perception can be genuinely world-revealing) is to pursue what, in the 
original article, I referred to as a ‘more metaphysical’ argument that 
might be thought to support something like ECM.  In Clark 2009 I 
deliberately bracketed those arguments first, because they seemed to 
me to raise a host of quite different issues, and second, because the 
enactivist presented herself as offering us a set of novel 
considerations (concerning the functional role of action in 
perception) rather than as appealing to these more familiar forms of 
argument. My concern was thus only to engage with (and reject) the 
apparently novel considerations as offering good grounds for ECM 
or indeed (as we have just seen) for the enactivist conception of 
experience itself.  Nonetheless, it may help to say a word about why 
the more metaphysical route doesn’t actually strike me as in any way 
undermining the kind of empirical story I have been sketching. 
 
The question to ask is, must an internalist account of  (what we may 
call) the implementing machinery of conscious experience reject the 
idea that perception, when all goes well, is in some sense directly 
world-revealing? It is by no means obvious that it must. The kinds of 
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mechanism I have sketched provide a means by which an agent may 
come to perceive the world. They do not, for example, provide a 
means by which an agent comes to perceive her own internal 
representations of the world. For what is perceived are not 
representations but the world. Representations, as they figure in 
cognitive scientific accounts of the kind on offer, are causally 
implicated in this process. And understanding this fact helps us to 
make empirical sense of the very possibility of dreaming, 
hallucination, and the like. Still, the super-tight empirical link (briefly 
sketched above) between the mechanisms of perception and the 
mechanisms of dreaming, imagination, and hallucination suggests 
that we should consider these latter cases as co-arising within the 
general setting of mechanisms for veridical perception and effective 
action. Considered in this way, the mechanistic story on offer simply 
shows how beings like us are able to achieve genuine access to the 
causal structure of our environment14. They show, as my colleague 
Matt Nudds once put it to me, how it is that we can be ‘open to the 
world’. To the extent that this is correct, mere openness to the world 
provides no metaphysical trump card for the enactivist. Equipped 
with brains like ours we become porous to the world. Its structure 
and statistical regularities flow through us in as real a way as do food 
and water through the digestive tract.  
 
  
6. Conclusions: Let The World In, and Dream 
 
Ward (2012) invites us to reconsider what Clark (2009) presented as 
the enactivist arguments for the extended conscious mind (ECM), 
depicting them as first and foremost an invitation to embrace a 
world-involving conception of experience itself, and only in that way 
as (then more or less trivially) supporting an extended mechanistic 
basis for experience.  The trouble with this is threefold.                                                          
14 For a detailed argument consonant with this claim, see Millar 2007. Ward (2012, footnote 
7) suggests that the enactivist, by contrast, cannot embrace Millar’s proposal.  
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First, the positive considerations that Ward highlights are (or so I 
have argued) equally well accommodated by alternative (prediction-
and-generative-model based) accounts. These accounts look, 
however, to be internalist about the mechanisms of perceptual 
experience. Second, these models have the added benefit of bringing 
perception, dreaming, and imagination into a common framework. 
This, I argued, is an advantage as it enhances the ‘fit’ (between 
personal-level experience and our best sub-personal stories) to which 
Ward centrally appeals. Finally - though this is a matter in need of 
much further discussion - the kinds of models I describe seem to me 
to deliver a means by which we might nonetheless properly be said to 
be perceptually open to the world.  
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